Although the 2016 election brought authoritarianism into mainstream American political discourse (MacWilliams 2016) , the dominant narrative focused almost exclusively on Republicans who consistently fall on the high end of the authoritarianism scale (Federico and Tagar 2014; Hetherington and Weiler 2009 ). While it is true that high authoritarians have sorted en masse into the Republican Party, it is a misconception that authoritarianism has little to no significance within the Democratic Party. Though Republicans tend to exhibit higher levels of authoritarianism than Democrats, there is substantial variation in authoritarianism among Democrats. We argue that disregarding these intraparty divisions provides an incomplete account of authoritarianism's role in the current political landscape.
This research note addresses these concerns by demonstrating that authoritarianism not only exists within the Democratic Party, but exerted strong and divisive effects on voting preferences within the 2016 primary between relatively moderate, establishment candidate Hillary Clinton and progressive, populist candidate Bernie Sanders. Specifically, high authoritarian Democrats supported Clinton while low authoritarian Democrats supported Sanders. We speculate that this authoritarian divide will further complicate the Democratic leadership's attempts to unify their party's base in future elections.
Authoritarianism and the Democratic Party
Authoritarianism reflects a spectrum of psychological group orientations ranging from individual autonomy to social conformity (Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005) , where high authoritarians possess dispositional needs for order, certainty, and security, and adherence to conventional, established institutions (Jost et al. 2003; Hetherington and Weiler 2009 ). Accordingly, authoritarian dispositions provide a functional link to ideological conservatism (Federico and Tagar 2014) , right-wing policy preferences (Johnston and Wronski
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2015; Hetherington and Suhay 2011), and traditionalism (Federico, Fisher, and Deason 2011 ).
Yet the construct of authoritarianism also contains group-centric components, which motivate authoritarians to structure their group in ways that, "…enhance sameness and minimize diversity of people, beliefs, and behaviors" (Stenner 2005: 16) . From this perspective, authoritarians aim to protect the group's cohesion from members and leaders who do not comply with the group's values and norms. Importantly, this component of authoritarianism is grounded in the desire to be part of a group, not in identification with a particular social or political group (Duckitt 1989; Stellmacher and Petzel 2005) . Taking these conceptualizations together, authoritarians should be more committed to their political party (per Luttig 2017), and support leaders that are more conventional or prototypical of the group (Hogg 2001).
The 2016 Democratic primary election provides an excellent context of intra-party competition within which to examine the effects of authoritarianism on vote choice. On one hand, Clinton was a traditional candidate, being relatively hawkish and religious, and a group exemplar with a decades-long career in the party. On the other hand, Sanders was a nontraditional, party outsider who adopted the Democratic label more recently and distinguished himself as a "democratic socialist." Authoritarianism could, therefore, shape Democratic primary vote choice on the basis of its association with traditionalism (Federico, Fisher and Deason 2011; Hetherington and Weiler 2009) and its latent motive to preserve group uniformity and support more prototypical group leaders (Stenner 2005; Stellmacher and Petzel 2005; Hogg 2001) . We thus predict an authoritarian divide among Democrats in the 2016 primary elections, with high authoritarians gravitating towards Clinton and low authoritarians towards Sanders.
Data and Methods
To test the effects of authoritarianism among Democrats, we utilized data from two 2" nationally diverse sources: the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) University of Mississippi module (Dowling 2016), and a YouGov study fielded Fall 2017 (N=1000 each, see Table A1 ). We also used a nonprobability sample of undergraduates from five Southern universities, comprised predominantly of first-time voters (N=955, see Table A1 ). The student sample provides a test of our hypothesis among individuals whose political ideology and partisan loyalties are still malleable (Campbell et al. 1960) , while their dispositional traits, like authoritarianism, are relatively stable and exogenous to political socialization (McCourt et al. 1999 ). Thus, although the student sample is non-representative, it allows us to examine to what extent authoritarianism among young Democrats is already a predictive force of their voting behavior and how its effect compares to their developing political preferences such as partisanship and ideology. Since we are primarily interested in divisions within the Democratic Party, our full models only include Democrats who voted for either Clinton or Sanders in the 2016 primary 1 (N=295 CCES, N=217 YouGov, and N=163 student sample). Figure A4 , Table A7a & A7b).
The distribution of authoritarianism in our primary national dataset, the CCES (see Figure 1a ), confirms that Republicans (N=341, mean=0.62) are significantly more authoritarian than Democrats (N=461, mean=0.48, t=-6.4, p<0.001 in an independent t-test with unequal variances). Concurrently, however, the variation in authoritarianism is significantly higher 
Predicting 2016 Democratic Primary Vote Choice
We first logistically regress vote choice for Clinton versus Sanders on authoritarianism and our aforementioned control variables 3 ( Figure 2 & Table A3, see also Tables A4-A6 for robustness checks). In line with our expectations, authoritarianism is a significant and positive predictor of voting for Clinton over Sanders in all samples. In the CCES and YouGov samples, partisan strength is also a positive predictor of voting for Clinton. However, it was not a significant determinant in the undergraduate sample, demonstrating the primacy of authoritarian dispositions in shaping young people's political preferences. Similarly, ideology is only a significant predictor of voting for Clinton over Sanders in the YouGov sample, indicating that authoritarianism operates above and beyond ideological identification and partisan strength.
Finally, we find that authoritarianism is the only significant predispositional measure, suggesting 2" These variables are dropped in the student models given their lack of variation. See Table A2 for all variable descriptions.
3" Addition of the controls reduces the CCES sample to N=260, the YouGov sample to N=195, and the student sample to N=101 in the presented models.
that this candidate match-up specifically resonates with Democrats' authoritarian dispositions. Table A2 for variable details).
Figure 2: Logistic Regression Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders

Note: Plots show coefficients from logistic regression models. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 2017 YouGov, and the 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1, except for age, which is measured in decades (see
The predicted probabilities displayed in Figure 3 clearly illustrate the effects of authoritarianism on Democratic vote choice in all three data sets. As a Democrat in the CCES sample moves from the minimum value on the authoritarianism scale to the maximum value, the probability of voting for Clinton increases from 0.33 to 0.76 while holding other influential factors constant. Similarly, the probability of voting for Clinton rises from 0.36 to 0.71 across the range of authoritarianism in the YouGov sample, closely mirroring the results from the CCES.
Among students, the effect is even larger -the probability of voting for Clinton increases dramatically from 0.18 to 0.867 as young Democrats shift from the lower end of authoritarianism to its maximum value. Table A1 ).
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Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities based on Logistic Regression Results
Note: Predicted probabilities are calculated holding all variables at their mean or modal categories (see
These results provide evidence for an authoritarian divide among Democrats that played a crucial role in the 2016 primary. Importantly, these effects are driven by respondents at both the low and high ends of authoritarianism. Surprisingly, we do not find any significant effect of authoritarianism among Republicans' primary vote choice in all three samples (see Figure A5 & Table A8 ), which underlines the uniquely divisive nature of authoritarianism among Democrats.
Moreover, as we have shown by replicating our results with a student sample, this authoritarian divide is already discernable among young Democrats whose party loyalties and ideological preferences are not yet solidified. This emphasizes the importance of authoritarianism, even among first-time voters.
Conclusion
We have demonstrated that authoritarianism 1) exists within the Democratic Party, where variation on this disposition abounds, 2) imparts differential effects on vote choice, highlighting intraparty conflicts, and 3) predicts political preferences, even among youth, for whom partisan strength and ideology are less stable factors. In 2016, Clinton was the more traditional candidate,
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with a long history as a brand name party figure who had taken on various leadership rolescharacteristics which should appeal to authoritarian Democrats. In contrast, Sanders was an Independent turned Democrat, who promoted an aggressively liberal agenda with an unambiguous disdain for the party establishment, all of which authoritarians should eschew.
While we discuss traditionalism and group-centric aspects of authoritarianism, the causal mechanism by which this trait affected Democrats' vote choice remains unclear in the present data. Future research should assess how these aspects of authoritarianism shape electoral behavior among voters in both parties. "Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements." 1.!Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. 2.!It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. 3.!Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. 4.!Most blacks who don't get ahead should not blame the system; they only have themselves to blame. Each item includes the following 4 response options: Strongly Agree, Somewhat Agree, Somewhat Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. All four items are scaled together, and coded 0-1 such that higher values represent greater racial resentment. Symbolic Racism (CCES sample) "Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?" 1.!I am angry that racism exists. 2.!White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin. 3.!Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations. Each item includes the following 6 response options: Strongly Agree, Agree, Agree Slightly, Disagree Slightly, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. All three items are scaled together, and coded 0-1 such that higher values represent greater symbolic racism.
Democratic Primary Vote Choice
In the CCES sample, respondents were first asked if they voted in any 2016 primary, while in the YouGov sample they were first asked if they voted in the 2016 Democratic primary. In both studies, those that answered "yes" to this item received a follow-up question asking who they voted for. Options in the CCES included: Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders, Another Democrat, Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, John Kasich, Marco Rubio, Another Republican, and Someone else who is not a Democrat or Republican. Options in the YouGov study included: Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders, Someone Else, and Don't Recall.
In the student sample, respondents were asked: "Who did you vote for in your state's presidential primary?" Response options included: Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders, Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, John Kasich, Other, and Didn't Vote in Primary.
For each sample, the variable of Democratic primary vote choice is constructed such that those who said they voted for Bernie Sanders were coded 0, and those voting for Hillary Clinton were coded 1. The few primary voting respondents who did not choose either of these Democratic primary candidates either voted for a Republican, or could not recall who they voted for. We treat these other responses as noise, and are coded as blank. Democrats (N=358, mean=0.47) and Republicans (N=233, mean = 0.61, t= 4.82, p < 0.001) . In a variance comparison test, we also find that Democrats (st.dev. = 0.37) exhibit significantly higher variation in authoritarianism than Republicans (st.dev = 0.31, F = 0.69, p < 0. (N = 72, mean = 0.29, t = 4.96, p < 0.001) . Democrats (N=349, mean=0.30) and Republicans (N=405, mean = 0.52, t= 10.23, p < 0. Democrats (st.dev. = 0.28) and Republicans (st.dev. = 0.30, F = 1.14, p < 0.18) . In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find a significant difference in authoritarianism between Democrats who supported Hillary Clinton (N = 43, mean = 0.40) and Democrats who supported Bernie Sanders (N = 113, mean = 0.22, p < 0.01 (N= 69, mean = 0.64) and Republicans who supported Ted Cruz (N=34, mean = 0.58, p< 0.36) . 
Figures A1a & A1b: Distributions of Authoritarianism (YouGov)
Note: Data come from the 2017 YouGov study. Authoritarianism is scaled from 0 (min) to 1 (max). Open circles indicate mean values for each group. In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find a significant difference in authoritarianism between
01). In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find a significant difference in authoritarianism between Democrats who supported Hillary Clinton (N = 112, mean = 0.54) and Democrats who supported Bernie Sanders
Figures A2a & A2b: Distributions of Authoritarianism (Students)
Note: Data come from the 2016 student sample. Authoritarianism is scaled from 0 (min) to 1 (max). Open circles indicate mean values for each group. In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find a significant difference in authoritarianism between
001). In a variance comparison test, we find no significant difference in the variation in authoritarianism between
(max). Open circles indicate mean values for each group. In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find no significant difference in authoritarianism between Republicans who supported Donald Trump
